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U.S. primacy in the face of chronic eco-
nomic challenges.
These issues are featured in assessments
of three alternative national security
strategies. The first alternative, “U.S.
Dominance and Preventive Action,” is
embraced by neoconservatives and
those within the administration and
elsewhere who have been referred to as
“assertive nationalists.” It begins with
the premise that “the most serious
threats to American security come from
the combination of terrorism, rogue
states, and weapons of mass destruc-
tion.” The capability and will to act pre-
emptively and unilaterally are essential;
American military dominance must be
maintained; and U.S. security requires
widespread democracy and capitalism.
The second option, “A More Stable
World with U.S. Power for Deterrence
and Containment,” is said to be favored
by moderate Republicans and Demo-
crats. They share the characterization of
the threat provided by advocates of op-
tion one, yet counsel against elevating
“preemption” to the status of a doc-
trine, emphasize the need for interna-
tional support in the ongoing war on
terror, and warn against the strategic
overextension that may well result from
proactively spreading free-market
democracies.
The distinctly liberal third option, “A
Cooperative World Order,” is reminis-
cent of the Clinton administration’s na-
tional security strategy—“Engagement
and Enlargement,” in Anthony Lake’s
formulation. To the nexus of terror-
ists, rogue states, and weapons of mass
destruction, its proponents add the
longer-term threats posed by “global
poverty, growing lawlessness, and the
increasing isolation of the United
States from like-minded states.” This
multitude of dangers requires
international diplomatic, economic,
and military cooperation; military re-
sponses are not to be given pride of
place. The United States must
strengthen, not tear asunder, interna-
tional norms and institutions. Even the
world’s dominant military power can-
not unilaterally ensure its security.
Korb masterfully translates the three al-
ternatives into full-blown presidential
addresses to Congress and the nation.
He also systematically and evenhand-
edly assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and political impact of each. Signifi-
cantly, “liberal,” for Korb, is not a
four-letter word. Unlike many Republi-
cans, he knows how to count. This vol-
ume should be required reading for
President George W. Bush, his advisers,
and the broader U.S. national security
community.
ANDREW L. ROSS
Naval War College
Scarborough, Rowan. Rumsfeld’s War. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Regnery, 2004. 253pp. $27.95
Rumsfeld’s War is a close-up look at one
of the most influential figures in the
Bush administration, and a key leader
in the current war against militant
Islamism. The book examines Rumsfeld
the man, reviewing his long and varied
career at the top levels of government
and industry, and analyzes his role in
the two principal themes of his tenure,
transformation of the Cold War mili-
tary and defeat of Middle Eastern
terrorism.
Rowan Scarborough is a well known
Washington Times reporter, specializing
in defense issues. While not a panegyric,
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his book provides a sympathetic look at
Rumsfeld. This is not surprising, in that
the Washington Times has been notably
supportive of the Bush administration.
As in his reporting, when writing his
book, Scarborough doubtless benefited
from close and frequent contact with
the senior people around the secretary
of defense.
One characteristic of Donald Rumsfeld
that leaps from the pages is his utter
self-assurance, bordering on arrogance,
which manifests itself as remarkable de-
cisiveness and precision in thought and
speech. The book opens with Rumsfeld’s
conversation with President Bush soon
after American Airlines flight 77
crashed into the Pentagon. He is noted
as saying, “This is not a criminal action,
this is war.” His phrase crystalized a
radical shift in strategic thinking that
decisively took America from the list-
less strategic drift of the 1990s to one of
activism and intervention. As noted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith, “That was really a break-
through strategically and intellectually.
Viewing the 9/11 attacks as a war that
required a war strategy was a very big
thought and a lot flowed from that.”
The twin themes of transformation and
fighting wars are inextricably inter-
twined. Serving as secretary of defense
for President Gerald Ford from 1975 to
1977, Rumsfeld returned to the White
House a second time with a specific
mandate from President Bush to
“transform” the military—bring strat-
egy and military capabilities into better
balance with the post–Cold War
geopolitical context. The Bush adminis-
tration came into office believing that
the Pentagon was too wedded to expen-
sive, obsolescing systems from the Cold
War and to the accompanying policies,
processes, and mind-set that demanded
more of the same. When Rumsfeld ag-
gressively set out to overturn the tables
in the Pentagon, he was met with deter-
mined resistance, for both substantive
and stylistic reasons. By early Septem-
ber 2001, there were widespread ru-
mors that Rumsfeld would be the first
cabinet secretary to resign, over his in-
ability to foster change in the Pentagon.
Flight 77 changed all that. The United
States was no longer chasing criminals,
it was at war. The operations in Afghan-
istan were dominated by remarkable
synergies between special operations
forces and precision weapons, themes
that had long been pushed by “transfor-
mation” advocates. In both Afghanistan
and Iraq, Rumsfeld insisted on far
smaller numbers of ground combat
units than the military leadership was
comfortable with, arguing that the syn-
ergies possible in a heavily netted joint
battle space, coupled with precision
weapons and targeting, greatly in-
creased the lethality and effectiveness of
U.S. forces. The combat results amply
repaid his confidence.
The lessons from the fighting merely re-
doubled Rumsfeld’s determination to
keep transforming the Department of
Defense. Battlefield results notwith-
standing, change in the military bu-
reaucratic processes remained difficult.
Rumsfeld noted that he “was struck by . . .
how resistant people are to looking at
strategy in a different way and pursuing
advantages, rather than focusing on re-
acting to threats.” On the other hand,
his often abrasive manner needlessly
antagonized people otherwise willing to
help bring about overdue change in the
Pentagon.
There is no doubt, however, that
Rumsfeld has made an enormous effort
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to overcome the stultifying stasis of the
huge Department of Defense bureau-
cracies—military and civilian—and the
mental inertia of fifty years of Cold War
thinking. As Scarborough notes,
“Rumsfeld’s task of reconfiguring the
military and fighting the war on terror
is so immense that it will take the light
of history to determine exactly what he
finally accomplished and at what he
failed.” If nothing else, Rumsfeld cre-
ated, if not institutionalized, the state of
intellectual ferment that antecedes ma-
jor change in any large organization.
Rumsfeld’s War is a quick, instructive
read from a pro-Rumsfeld perspective.
In that sense, it perhaps could be con-
sidered a counter to Bob Woodward’s
two recent “insider” books on the cur-
rent war, for which Woodward received
very little support from Rumsfeld, and
in which Rumsfeld is not sympatheti-
cally depicted. On the downside, the
book stylistically feels somewhat as if
the author threw together some of his
day-to-day reporting text and called it a
book. Also, fully one-third of the book
consists of appendices, with copies of
various memos and papers, many clas-
sified “secret”; no military reader can
applaud the open use of such docu-
ments. However, the book is an inter-
esting depiction of a remarkable man.
As Scarborough notes on the final
page, “It is hard to imagine any other
man to whom Bush could have turned
to fight this war with more tenacity,
panache, and, at the appropriate time,
good humor.”
JAN VAN TOL
Captain, U.S. Navy
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Edited and
translated by Christopher Lynch. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2003. 262pp. $25
Machiavelli’s classic, if now rarely read,
The Art of War was probably the single
most popular military treatise in Eu-
rope prior to Jomini—Clausewitz was a
professed admirer.
At first sight, this book, with its appar-
ent attempt to revive the infantry-
centered military organization of the
imperial Roman legions, seems hope-
lessly irrelevant to present concerns.
Even within its historical setting (it was
originally published in 1521),
Machiavelli’s work is often dismissed
today for its alleged failure to appreci-
ate the social and technological
trends—particularly the growing im-
portance of gunpowder—underpinning
the “revolution in military affairs” of
the sixteenth century. Christopher
Lynch makes an excellent case that such
interpretations neglect the literary or
rhetorical dimension of The Art of War
and its relationship to Machiavelli’s
larger intellectual project. In an exten-
sive introduction, as well as an interpre-
tive essay, Lynch rebuts the criticisms of
contemporary scholars, defends
Machiavelli’s grasp of the military reali-
ties of his own day, and reinterprets the
intention of the work in relation to
Machiavelli’s more famous political trea-
tises, The Prince and Discourses on Livy.
Lynch’s key point is that Machiavelli
was not simply the backward-looking
admirer of Rome he is often taken to be
but a revolutionary thinker who com-
bined elements of past military and po-
litical systems in a novel synthesis. His
apparent reliance on Roman models is
to be understood fundamentally as a
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